U.S nuclear weapon policy Essay Example | Topics and Well Written Essays - 1000 words

U.S atomic weapon policy - Essay ExampleU.S nuclear weapon policyThe reasons for retaining a triad, a harvesting of very conservative estimates of what would be required to cope with a disarming Soviet first strike, argon non discussed officially. The assumption is that a floor exists beneath which U.S. forces cannot be allowed to fall, but this minimum level is not necessarily determined by targeting doctrine or the political goals that the doctrine is meant to uphold.The question of which countries the United States bequeath target with nuclear weapons in the future and under what circumstances is simply not articulated and for certain not clearly understood. According to some officials, this question does not require an a priori answer. The preponderance of U.S. strategical forces remains targeted at the former Soviet nuclear arsenal, considered an immutable imperative. Despite an agreement reached for the two sides to retarget their forces a start out from one anothers ter ritories a symbolic step it is emphasized repeatedly by defense officials that weapons could be speedily retargeted if necessary. The targeting review conducted by the Bush administration purportedly generated plans that provided for flexible options for global application, including the ability to retarget weapons quickly to jibe any contingency. More recently, plans have been discussed to target third world countries with highly accurate conventional forces as well. The vanishing Cold War nuclear order was the product of a need to deter aggression against NATO by superior Warsaw Pact conventional forces. NATO members were unwilling or unable to dedicate sufficient resources or to take the necessary steps to restructure their defense sectors to rectify the disparities in conventional capabilities. Nuclear weapons were a cheap way of maintaining a military balance. Outside of NATO, nuclear guarantees were extended very selectively to fuddled U.S. allies who confronted proximate e nemies allied with or part of the Soviet bloc. Insofar as these arrangements were considered legitimate, it was as part of a bipolar system in which the United States, Europe, and a few other allies were get together in a defensive alliance, while the Soviet Union was seen as an expansionist power solidification on global hegemony.With the exception of Russia and China, the current nuclear threat, to the extent it can be reliably defined, consists of a handful of states with small or fledgling programs and sometimes just immodest ambitions. This is not to belittle the dangers such(prenominal) states may pose to international or regional stability in the future. But the sudden rhytidoplasty of third world powers to the status of ruthless enemies on a par with the Soviet Union bears except examination, especially since it is now becoming a principal rationale for retaining a U.S. nuclear deterrent. Part of the system of logic of this phone line hinges on the notion that the Sovi et Union was rational, valued its survival, and could be targeted effectively, whereas the nuclear powers of the future in all likelihood will not share these traits. Now this may questioned Will our nuclear adversaries unendingly be rational, or at least operate with the same logic as we do We cant be sure. Will we always be able to put our adversaries at risk to make deterrence work Not necessarily, particularly with terrorists whom we may not even be able to find. But if one is going to make the argument that U.S. strategy falls apart in the face of a third world